The Impact of Jordan's Peace Treaty with Israel on Arab Unity
The late 20th century was marked by significant geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, particularly with the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979 and Jordan's subsequent peace treaty with Israel in 1994. This essay explores the reactions of other Arab countries, especially their initial displeasure and the subsequent changes in their positions towards Israel following these historic events.
The Displeasure and Backlash of Other Arab Countries
When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the Arab world was deeply divided. The reaction from other Arab countries was mixed, but many were highly displeased. President Anwar Sadat faced immense domestic and international criticism for his decision, ultimately losing his life over it. In contrast, King Hussein of Jordan faced less domestic backlash when he followed suit 15 years later, signing the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1994.
Factors Influencing Jordan's Decision
Several factors contributed to King Hussein's decision to sign the peace treaty with Israel despite the initial discontent. Firstly, Jordan's vulnerability to backlash during this period was exacerbated by the ongoing instability in Lebanon. The expulsion of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank and the rise of Hezbollah as a proxy for Iran’s revolutionary regime further complicated Jordan's position.
The Gradual Erosion of Arab Unity
By 1995, the concept of a united Arab front against Israel had been significantly weakened. Several key areas contributed to this:
1. Egypt's Role in Arab Nationalism
Egypt had long been a strong regional power supporting the Palestine-centric narrative of Arab nationalism. Year after year, the successful mutual economic and strategic benefits of Egyptian-Israeli relations undermined a united pro-Palestine Arab front.
2. Iran's Hijacking of the Northern Intifada through Hezbollah
The Northern Intifada was complicated by Iran's support for Hezbollah, complicating the idea of direct support for Palestinians. When it became clear that Hezbollah was a revolutionary Shiite group under Iranian auspices, it became difficult to justify blanket support for the anti-Israel/pro-Palestine agenda.
3. The Troubling State of the PLO
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had become a controversial entity by 1994. The events of Black September were not only remembered but also attributed to both Palestinians and Jordanians. The Hashimite dynasty of Jordan was seen as equally culpable as Israel for a second Palestinian Naqba. This state of de facto enmity between the PLO and Jordan made the idea of peace with Israel more palatable.
4. Assad's Divergent Interest
Hafez al-Assad's Syria faced subversion by Iran as the linchpin of the Shia Crescent strategy. Assad's motivations were clear and not aligned with pan-Arabist interests, making his position an outlier.
Together, these factors contributed to the eventual realization by Arab states, particularly Jordan, that peace with Israel was increasingly necessary and less politically detrimental. The Jordan-Israel peace treaty thus marked a significant shift in the Middle East's geopolitical landscape, signaling a reevaluation of collective Arab unity and a pragmatic approach towards regional stability.
Altogether, the 15-year timeline between the Egypt-Israel treaty in 1979 and the Jordan-Israel treaty in 1994 reflects a gradual shift in the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader Middle Eastern political environment.