The CIA and the Assassination of Ayatollah Khomeini: An Analysis

Why bother if the Iranian people disliked the Shah's freedoms and pined for a repressive theocracy, let them have what they want. Now they're living the good life, aren't they. How can you save a people from themselves and their own bad decisions?

It is a common argument that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the assassination of Ayatollah Khomeini. However, the historical evidence and strategic considerations suggest that such an assassination was neither feasible nor desirable during that period. Here is a detailed exploration of why the CIA did not engage in an assassination plot, and why their focus was on other objectives.

Political Constraints

The late 1970s were a tumultuous time in Iran, with the Shah's rule coming under intense scrutiny and pressure. The U.S. government was wary of direct intervention in the region after the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The CIA and other U.S. agencies were keen to avoid further destabilization, given the delicate balance of power in the Middle East.

Changing U.S. Policy

Initially, the U.S. supported the Shah of Iran, seeing him as a bulwark against communism in the region. However, as the Islamic Revolution gained momentum, U.S. policy shifted towards a more pragmatic approach. The aim was not to eliminate the leadership but to maintain some form of relationship with the new regime. The U.S. hoped to influence the newly formed Islamic Republic, ultimately to preserve its interests in the region.

The Risk of Backlash

An assassination attempt on Ayatollah Khomeini could have had significant and unintended consequences. It could have inflamed anti-American sentiment across the broader Middle East, potentially destabilizing other allied regimes. Moreover, it could have led to a backlash against U.S. interests in Iran and the region, creating a hostile environment for future diplomatic and strategic engagements.

Khomeini's Popularity

At the height of his popularity, Ayatollah Khomeini was a highly revered figure among the Iranian populace. An assassination could have turned him into a martyr, galvanizing support for the revolutionary cause rather than undermining it. The idea to martyr him was a significant risk and could have been counterproductive to U.S. interests.

Operational Limitations

The CIA operates under a framework of legal and ethical constraints. At the time, there may have been limitations on covert actions, particularly those involving assassination. The agency was focused on other objectives, such as intelligence gathering and analysis, rather than engaging in high-risk assassination plots. The rapid changes in the political landscape necessitated a more strategic and analytical approach.

Focus on Other Objectives

The CIA's focus during this period was more on understanding the complex political dynamics and foiling potential threats. The agency was tasked with gathering and analyzing intelligence to inform U.S. policy, rather than engaging in direct actions. Direct intervention and assassination plots were deemed too high-risk and could have led to unintended consequences.

Ultimately, the decision not to assassinate Ayatollah Khomeini was a strategic choice made out of a combination of political and ethical considerations. The CIA and the U.S. government prioritized a more nuanced approach, understanding the complexities of the situation and the potential risks of direct intervention.