Conspiracy Theories vs. Genuine Intelligence: The Case of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack
The question of why the United States did not alert Syrian civilians of an alleged foreknowledge of the impending chemical weapons attack has gained traction in conspiracy theory circles. This parallels the infamous scenario of the attack on Pearl Harbor, where the U.S. government had intercepted a Japanese communication hinting at an attack. To debunk these theories, it is crucial to understand the complexities of intelligence and the nature of information.
The Challenge of Untranslated Intelligences
The Japanese communication regarding Pearl Harbor was not translated until after the attack, rendering it ineffective as a warning instrument. Similarly, any intercepted communication regarding the Syrian regime would need to be translated and analyzed in a timely manner to be considered actionable. Simply having untranslated information is not sufficient to constitute genuine intelligence.
How Would the U.S. Have Known When and Where Such an Attack Would Occur?
Information alone is insufficient to guarantee the timing or location of an attack. Without specific details, warnings would be ineffective and could even undermine the credibility of the intelligence network if it proved inaccurate too often. The U.S. must balance the need for rapid dissemination with the need to protect sensitive methods and sources.
Context and Historical Precedents
There was little expectation that the Assad regime would use chemical weapons. The West had warned against such actions, making it even more significant when they did occur. The usage of chemical weapons might indicate that the regime is running out of conventional munitions, or it could suggest desperation due to potential losses in the conflict. This raises further questions about the rebels' decision to use these weapons, considering the logistical challenges they face.
The Role of International Consensus and Military Objectives
John Burgess, a prominent intelligence analyst, emphasized the difficulty in retrospectively connecting dots without the pressure of in-the-moment decision-making. Even with potential intelligence, the U.S. should aim for international consensus before acting, especially in a non-international conflict where key players like the UK and Russia oppose intervention. Assigning blame for inaction is not straightforward when considering the complexities of military planning and execution.
Additional Challenges:
Implementing effective military objectives requires clear planning and objectives. Without a cohesive O-Plan, any intervention risks being ineffective and potentially harmful. The reconnaissance and deployment of forces would need to be meticulously planned to maximize both efficacy and safety. Additionally, the ethical and moral implications of intervention must be carefully weighed against the potential consequences of inaction.
In conclusion, the lack of a timely and precise warning about the Syrian chemical weapons attack cannot be attributed solely to intelligence failures. It reflects the complex interplay of geopolitical, ethical, and tactical challenges faced by intelligence agencies and policymakers. Further research and transparent communication about these challenges are essential to foster greater understanding and trust in intelligence operations.